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Designing regulatory policy with limited information
In: Fundamentals of pure and applied economics 20
In: Government ownership and regulation of economic activity section
Subsidizing Research Programs with 'If' and 'When' Uncertainty in the Face of Severe Informational Constraints
In: Besanko, David and Jian Tong and Jason Wu (2018), "Subsidizing Research Programs with 'If' and 'When' Uncertainty in the Face of Severe Informational Constraints", RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 49, No. 2, Summer 2018, pp. 285–310.
SSRN
Capacity Dynamics and Endogenous Asymmetries in Firm Size
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 23
ISSN: 1756-2171
Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 646
ISSN: 1756-2171
Sequential-Equilibrium Investment by Regulated Firms
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 153
ISSN: 1756-2171
Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information
In: The Economic Journal, Band 99, Heft 396, S. 408
Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 509
ISSN: 1756-2171
Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 447
ISSN: 1756-2171
Regulation and information in a continuing relationship
In: Information economics and policy, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 267-302
ISSN: 0167-6245
How Efficient Is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment
In: American economic review, Band 109, Heft 9, S. 3339-3364
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study industries where the price that a firm sets serves as an investment into lower cost or higher demand. We assess the welfare implications of the ensuing competition for the market using analytical and numerical approaches to compare the equilibria of a learning-by-doing model to the first-best planner solution. We show that dynamic competition leads to low deadweight loss. This cannot be attributed to similarity between the equilibria and the planner solution. Instead, we show how learning-by-doing causes the various contributions to deadweight loss to either be small or partly offset each other. (JEL D21, D25, D43, D83, L13)
How Efficient is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment
In: NBER Working Paper No. w23829
SSRN
Working paper
The Economics of Predation: What Drives Pricing When There Is Learning-by-Doing?
In: American economic review, Band 104, Heft 3, S. 868-897
ISSN: 1944-7981
We formally characterize predatory pricing in a modern industry-dynamics framework that endogenizes competitive advantage and industry structure. As an illustrative example we focus on learning-by-doing. To disentangle predatory pricing from mere competition for efficiency on a learning curve we decompose the equilibrium pricing condition. We show that forcing firms to ignore the predatory incentives in setting their prices can have a large impact and that this impact stems from eliminating equilibria with predation-like behavior. Along with the predation-like behavior, however, a fair amount of competition for the market is eliminated. (JEL D21, D43, D83, K21, L13, L41)